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Resumen
A pesar de la influencia teórica indiscutible de Cournot sobre la teoría 
contemporánea, su legado en relación con las políticas económicas y en 
particular con la regulación de los monopolios es mucho menor. Este trabajo 
explora las formas diversas que tiene el análisis de las estructuras monopólicas 
de mercado propuesto por Cournot, partiendo de su modelo teórico hasta su 
análisis más normativo y empírico. Utilizando textos poco conocidos del autor 
se pone en evidencia la versatilidad de sus ideas y la riqueza de su legado 
analítico. A partir de estos elementos se intenta reconstruir la influencia que 
sus ideas tuvieron sobre tres de los principales autores de finales del siglo XIX: 
Walras, Edgeworth y Marshall. Se muestra que existe una representación 
teórica que constituye la referencia indiscutible sobre los monopolios pero que 
se enriquece en los análisis normativos y resulta en propuestas de regulación 
y de política económica diversas que cada uno de estos autores desarrolla y 
se apropia de manera diferente.  
Palabras clave: Cournot, Walras, Edgeworth, Marshall, Monopolio, 
Organización Industrial
Abstract
In spite of Cournot’s unquestionable influence on contemporary theory, 
his legacy regarding economic policy and, especially, the regulation of 
monopolies is mostly unknown. In this paper I explore the several forms 
of Cournot’s analysis of monopolistic market structures, starting with his 
theoretical model up to his normative and empirical examination. With the 
help of little known texts of the author I aim at showing the versatility of his 
ideas and the richness of his analytical legacy. Against this setup I retrace 
his influence over three of the most important economists of the end of the 
XIXth century: Walras, Edgeworth and Marshall. I show that there exists a 
theoretical representation that constitutes the indisputable reference regarding 
monopolies that is enriched with normative analyses and leads each one of 
them to their own specific proposals in regulation and economic policy.
Keywords: Cournot, Walras, Edgeworth, Marshall, Monopoly, Industrial 
Organization
Clasificación JEL: 
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1.  Introduction
This paper analyses how Cournot’s views on Monopoly have influenced 
the early neoclassical authors. It is argued that there are two different 
points of view derived from the cournotian evaluation of the consequence 
of Monopoly. The first one is a purely theoretical construction that has 
been adopted by modern economic theory. Even if it is a theoretical one 
it has normative consequence. From this point of view, Cournot and his 
heirs have derived normative elements justifying a negative appreciation 
on Monopoly. The second is a more pragmatic point of view. Whereas the 
former is purely theoretical the latter is derived from multiple examples and 
it cannot be based on the same theoretical framework as the well known 
theory of monopoly prices. From this pragmatic point of view, Cournot 
constructs a more positive appreciation on the existence of monopolies. 
These two different appraisals on imperfect markets have influenced 
in different ways the works of the authors of the Marginal Revolution. 
Following this distinction we study the different points of view of Walras, 
Edgeworth and Marshall on Monopoly. We show that even if Walras’s 
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theory of Monopoly does not have the same theoretical foundations of 
Cournot’s, his normative point of view on monopolies is closely related with 
the “purely theoretical” conclusions. Walras frequently quoted Cournot 
on these matters. Edgeworth and Marshall have a different point of view 
on Monopoly, mainly pragmatic and sometimes quite positive from the 
normative point of view. However Walras’s as well as Edgeworth’s and 
Marshall’s theories on monopoly unveil the distance between their pure 
economic theories on perfect competition and their ideas on imperfect 
competition. Even if they tried both seriously to found their analysis of 
imperfect competition market structures as deviations from their theoretical 
representations of a perfectly competitive market, the resulting analyses 
do not satisfied their methodological desiderata. We conclude that the 
marginalists’ views on imperfect competition are not always constructed as 
“perturbations” or “frictions” of a perfectly competitive market. Imperfect 
competition and in particular monopolies push them to consider some 
modifications of their theoretical frameworks or even to introduce more 
pragmatic considerations leading them to conclusions rather doctrinal 
than theoretical.
As Cournot’s theory of Monopoly has an important place in modern 
Economics, most historians of economics has focused his attention on 
his methodological legacy as the precursor of mathematical economics. 
The purely theoretical point of view seems the sole aspect of Cournot’s 
monopoly theory remaining in history of economic thought. Two recent 
papers try to avoid this common view on Cournot. Friedman (2000) 
presents the successive historical stages of this legacy. He concludes that 
the cournotian influence on Walras, Edgeworth and Marshall relies on the 
theory of oligopoly and the famous Bertrand-Cournot debate. Monopoly 
theory is not mentioned as a central issue. Dos Santos Ferreira (2004) 
focuses his attention on a more general conception of competition, 
including Monopoly, Oligopoly and Perfect Competition. However, this 
author focuses his attention on the cooperative vs. non-cooperative aspects 
of these analyses. We agree in the general views of Dos Santos Ferreira’s 
paper, but we propose an original lecture of the analysis on normative 
views of the authors on Monopoly. Our analysis enriched the literature 
on Cournot’s legacy extending the study to his non-mathematical work 
on economics (Cournot 1863) which has been neglected in most of the 
103
Año 14 / Abril 2010
No.30
literature. We propose also to go further into the analysis of Walras’s and 
Edgeworth’s normative works in order to enrich a comparative analysis of 
the marginalists’ views on imperfect competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: A description of Cournot’s 
pure theory of Monopoly followed by section on his normative views. In 
the fourth section we consider, first, the influence on Walras’s theoretical 
and political positions on Monopoly and finally we contrast it with the 
influence of Cournot’s views on Edgeworth and Marshall.
2.  Cournot pure theory of competition and monopoly
For Cournot, perfect competition is a limit case of a general analysis 
on the determination of prices. Cournot’s general theory of competition 
aims at providing a rationale (to give an explicit rational argument) to the 
determination of prices in order to go further than the “common sense” 
notions of the, nowadays named, demand and supply laws. He believes 
that the propositions like “The price of a commodity is increasing on 
its demand”, are sterile from a scientific point of view1. His alternative 
proposition consists in providing a representation of the market for a 
particular good, composed by a given demand function depending on 
the price (decreasing), with a passive behavior, and a strategic behavior 
on the supply side of the market. The attention is thus focused on the 
actions of producers, namely their strategic choices. This reasoning leads 
him to build the basic framework for what is today known as Industrial 
Organization and the policy issues derived from it.
Cournot’s theory of prices does not aim at providing an explanation of 
the coordination process of a system of markets. It is not a theory of value 
based on a general equilibrium model, because there is no such an idea 
of general coordination of self interested agents. Even if Cournot considers 
the mutual influence of different goods, and thus different markets, on the 
determination of the price of each of them (chapter 9 in Cournot 2001), 
this is only to consider the case of a collusion of complementary inputs 
contributing to the production of the same good. The main concern of the 
cournotian approach is whether different degrees of competition affect 
1 Cournot (2001: 35-36), chapter 4, paragraph 20. 
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in different ways the final price of a simple good. This constitutes the 
basis for a solution of multiple applied questions. More precisely, the goal 
of Cournot’s theory of competition is to contribute to the analysis of the 
distribution of wealth and to provide a rational for the regulation of the 
market:
… here it is intended to know how, following some changes in production 
or in commercial relationships, prices will go up, down or will they tend 
to equilibrate; how gains or losses will be distributed among owners, 
entrepreneurs, workers … (Cournot 1863, paragraph 11, p: 19-20)2.
The main achievement of Cournot’s theory is the possibility to apply 
the same principle to different degrees of competition, starting by the 
pure monopoly case. This implies that perfect competition (i.e. unlimited 
competition3) is nor a theoretical, neither a normative, benchmark 
situation. On the contrary, perfect competition is a particular case4 where 
each producer or competitor has nil marginal incidences on the price. 
This situation is attained, not only by the presence of a great number of 
competitors, but also by the presence of a “threat” for every producer, 
related to the presence of a perfect substitute for each one of them. The 
whole theoretical framework is thus constructed upon strategic behavior 
of agents. A monopolist has to anticipate the variations of the demand 
for his own good in order to obtain the maximum level of profit (Cournot 
2001, chapter 5). When a few number (i.e. two for the simplest case) of 
competitors is present in the market, the space of strategies (as defined in 
modern strategic game theoretical analysis) is enlarged to take account 
not only of the demand but also of others competitors’ strategies (Cournot 
2001, chapter 7). Finally, when a collusion among producers is possible 
(Cournot 2001, chapter 9), the strategic behavior is still the defining 
feature of individuals’ behavior. In this case, we cannot talk about a 
cooperative game solution for the stability of the coalition of producers. 
2 Our translation. The original french quotation: «… s'agit-il de savoir comment, par suite de 
changements dans les conditions de la production ou dans les relations commerciales, les prix 
hausseront, baisseront, se nivelleront; comment les profits ou les pertes se repartiront entre les 
propriétaires, les entrepreneurs, les ouvriers … » 
3  In French: Concurrence indéfinie (Chapter 8 in Cournot 2001).
4  See some similar arguments in Dos Santos Ferreira & Gérard-Varet (2000) and Dos Santos 
(2002) and (2004).
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On the contrary, the case proposed by Cournot when the case of collusion 
among producers is analyzed, is not that of producers of the same good 
deciding to take advantage of monopoly power, but the formation of a 
group of producers of different inputs taking part in the production of a 
unique final good acting together as a monopolist. From this, it follows 
that each of the participant has interest to take part in the collusion taking 
into account common information: the demand for the final good. The 
strategic behavior is not eliminated but reinforced, and the final solution 
of this situation is an “artificial” monopoly. 
The cournotian approach to competition is thus based on the strategic 
interaction of producers in partial equilibrium analysis. It is important to 
remark that he solution concept proposed by Cournot does not presuppose 
the knowledge of the entire set of strategies for every producer (or player). 
However, the analysis leading to establish a well defined solution for every 
case is based on reasoning where, by successive approximations, the 
players discover the relevant set of information about others’ strategies. 
Some authors have underlined the limits of this dynamic analysis, and in 
particular its lack of coherence because it supposes that during the “try 
and error” process for one player, an ad-hoc ceteris paribus hypothesis is 
supposed5. This criticism is somehow extreme. The final solution of the 
problem, given by Cournot, is not false and the suggestion of a dynamic 
process is a pedagogical device. He is well aware of the problems of 
stability related to informational issues or possible errors on expectations 
of the players:
In other terms, this state would not be a stable equilibrium situation; and even 
being good for both producers, it is not long-standing unless a formal link 
among them is established. We cannot suppose, in the moral world, men being 
excepted from error or misleading actions, as it is not possible to find within 
the physic nature of things a perfect rigid body, a perfectly stable foundation 
and so on. (Cournot 2001, chapter 7, paragraph 44, p: 62)6.
5 It has been emphasized by some authors that Cournot’s solution to the oligopoly case is an 
early version of the Nash equilibrium notion (Negishi 2001).
6 Our translation. French original quotation: “En d’autres termes, cet état ne sera pas une 
situation d’équilibre stable ; et, bien que le plus favorable aux deux producteurs, il ne pourra 
subsister à moins d’un lien formel ; parce qu’on ne peut pas plus supposer, dans le monde 
moral, des hommes exempts d’erreurs et d’inconsidération, que dans la nature physique des 
corps parfaitement rigides, des appuis parfaitement fixes, et ainsi de suite”
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In the case of Monopoly, the same “pedagogical” device is proposed. 
Cournot supposes that the monopolist producer does not know the actual 
demand he is facing. It is gradually discovered by successive approximations, 
proposing prices producing a reaction on demand and a particular level 
of income for the monopolist. Given a constant demand function, and its 
passive character we have underlined so far, the monopolist will finally 
unveil the actual form of this function and solve the maximization of his 
own profit function. This is obviously a way to give an empirical sensation 
of the solution of the monopolist problem, otherwise the hypothesis of 
perfect information and thus an omniscient agent could be too shocking 
for the reader. Moreover, as we will show in the next section, Cournot’s 
analysis of the welfare consequence and the regulation policy are based 
on comparative statics. This therefore requires a solution concept as a 
benchmark for the analysis and the same solution concept for the final 
situation. This may seem a methodology similar to nowadays standard 
Industrial Organization analysis. However, there exists a main difference: 
in modern normative analysis, economics have adopted a procedure where 
the “first best” situation of the perfect competition framework constitutes 
the benchmark for the policy implication analysis. In the cournotian 
approach, the negative consequences of monopoly are judged from the 
point of view of political considerations and criteria related to an idea of 
the “general interest” opposed to the “particular interest”. These criteria 
are established following a very simple normative. This principle is other 
than what economics uses today: namely the Pareto optimality. 
In order to reconstruct the normative criteria proposed by Cournot 
guiding his policy analysis and in particular the regulation of monopolies 
one needs to read Cournot’s non-mathematical works. In the following 
section we will expose at a glance his normative analysis based on those 
almost unnoticed books.
3.  The cournotian normative analysis 
The normative statements in Cournot’s work are not very explicit in 
his best known Recherches sur les principes mathématiques des richesses 
(Cournot 2001). In order to grasp clearer the policy implications of 
his analysis we have to explore his non-mathematical book Principes 
de la théorie des richesses (Cournot 1863). Even if the later has being 
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considered as a merely transcription into non-mathematic language of the 
former, Cournot announces in the preface (“au lecteur”) of this work the 
presence of some developments going further his first economic work. 
Little attention has been paid to these developments.
I have reformulated my 1838 book. I have taken it back by solving some of its 
problems, developing further some insufficiently developed ideas and fulfilling 
some points I have avoided to study on it, and in particular I retired the whole 
algebraic exposition that scared some people on this matters. (Cournot 1863, 
Au lecteur: II)7
Tough, this new work, written in a non-mathematical language, never 
had the impact Cournot’s was searching for. In particular, Cournot’s 
statements on policy matters have been almost completely ignored by 
modern cournotians and historians of economic thought. In his 1863 book 
he presents the basic notions of his theory on prices with special emphasis 
on his main achievement on monopoly price: 
He [the monopolist] could, on the benefit of his monopole, fixe a price of 
twenty francs per liter for this water: but he will understand very fast, because 
of the scarcity of the demand, that this price is not the best for him. He will 
then reduce it successively and then rise it a little if the experience shows him 
that he has reduced it too much, finally he will stop at a level giving him the 
highest possible brut revenue. (Cournot 1863, chapter 7: 107)8
We can recognize here the pedagogical exposition of the process 
of discovery, by the monopolist, of the demand function of the market 
and the well known conclusion: the monopolist fixes the maximum 
price he can obtain from the market demand. Cournot then presents 
another general conclusion of his first (mathematical) economic work: the 
increasing presence of competitors within a market leads to a reduction in 
the price of the good and an increasing of the level of production. This is 
7 Our translation. Original french quotation: « j'ai repris man travail de 1838 en le corrigeant, en 
le developpant là où les developpements manquaient, en le completant sur les points auxquels 
je m'étais abstenu de toucher, et surtout en le depouillant absolument de l'attirail d'algebre qui 
effarouche tant en ces matières ».
8  Our translation. Original french quotation: « Il pourrait, à la faveur de son monopole, fixer à 
vingt francs le prix du litre de cette eau·: mais il s'apercevrait bien vite, à la rarete des demandes, 
que ce prix n'est pas le plus avantageux pour lui·: il l'abaissera donc successivement, puis le 
relèvera un peu si l'expérience lui montre qu'il l'a par trop abaissé et, finalement, il s'arrêtera au 
taux qui lui donne le plus gros revenue …”
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a “common sense” argument to argue the desirability of competition and 
of the establishment of a free market regime. However, in the very last 
chapters of this same book (1863), Cournot presents a surprising argument 
against perfect competition and in favor of monopoly, as we shall study.
The notion of competition, in this non-mathematical work, is free from 
the pure formal considerations of his first book. In fact, in his early book he 
is restrained to present the competition between producers not as a struggle 
aiming at obtaining more market-power, namely to attract a greater part of 
the market demand. This is in fact the origin of the well-known criticism by 
Bertrand. Following him, the cournotian analysis of competition ignores 
the fact that an increase in the price asked by a producer leads to a loss 
of the whole demand and a proportional increase on the demand for his 
competitor’s product. As it is easy to observe, Bertrand’s criticism is based 
on a very different conception of the role of the demand side of the market 
on the determination of prices. As we stated above, Cournot’s pure theory 
of price (as developed in his 1838 book) is based on the analysis of the 
active strategic behavior of producers under the assumption of a constant 
(i.e. passive) market demand. The surprise arrives in his late book, when 
Cournot develops the following argument on the negative consequences 
of perfect competition: 
If there is in the monopole an element of disagreement between the general 
and the particular interests, there is also another element of disagreement 
between the general and the particular interests within competition. Both 
are equally visible for the common opinion today. When forceful competition 
leads prices downward, and in particular the price of work, conducing to 
the malaise of the producers and bringing illness to the productive system, 
it harms not only those directly affected. This forceful competition becomes 
harmful for the whole social body, though the apparent advantages for some 
social classes; as a living organism suffering from one healthy organ stealing 
nutrients from other organs”. (Cournot 1863, book IV, chapter II: 436-437)9. 
9 Our translation. Original french quotation: « … s'il ya dans le monopole un principe de désaccord 
entre l'intérêt particulier et l'intérêt général, il y en a un autre dans la concurrence, qui ne frappe 
guère moins aujourd’hui les yeux de la foule. Quand l'aiguillon de la concurrence pousse à 
avilir les prix, et notamment le prix du travail, jusqu’à amener le malaise des producteurs 
et à vicier les organes de la production, il ne nuit pas seulement à ceux qui en souffrent 
immédiatement; il devient nuisible au corps social tout entier, quelque avantage apparent qu'il 
donne pour le moment à d'autres classes de la société: de même que le corps vivant tout entier 
souffre de l'embonpoint d'un organe qui dérobe à d'autres organes les sucs nourriciers. »
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Where does this harmful of competitions rest upon? It is related not 
only with price competition, as it is evident from the above quotation, but 
also with other strategies used by entrepreneurs to survive and succeed in 
a competitive market. 
If, additionally, competition presses to alter the quality of goods, to seduce 
consumers with false savings, to produce more than demand can buy, 
producing continuously commercial crisis, those evils, for the social body 
as well as for the producers themselves, will be more obvious, so it is also 
that evident that free competition may create those outcomes (Op. cit., we 
underline)10.
The two arguments presented in this quotation cannot be sustained on 
the basis of the pure theoretical framework developed in the Recherches sur 
les principles mathématiques. The first argument is based on the analysis 
of an integrated system of markets (i.e. general equilibrium analysis): a 
sector being pulled up by competition pulling down other sectors and 
producing a systemic crisis. As we have showed so far, Cournot’s theory 
of prices and competition was developed within a partial equilibrium 
analysis. The second argument is even more striking for it appeals to a 
theory of competition where the producers are trying to gain part of the 
market demand against other producers. In particular, trying to “seduce 
consumers” implies a conception of the demand in contradiction with his 
assumption on the independence of the demand functions faced by each 
producer (Cournot 2001, chapter 7, paragraph 43: 59-60). This hypothesis, 
was exploited by the well-known Bertrand’s criticism and well noticed by 
Edgeworth:
Starting with complete monopoly, we shall find the price continually diminish 
as the number of monopolists increases, until the point of complete fluidity is 
reached. This gradual ‘extinction’ of the influence of monopoly is well traced 
by Cournot in a discussion masterly, but limited by a particular condition, 
which may be called uniformity of price, not (it is submitted) abstractedly 
necessary in cases of imperfect competition. (Edgeworth 1881, p: 47).
10 Our translation. French original quotation: “ (…) Si de plus la concurrence pousse à altérer 
les qualités, à séduire les consommateurs par l'apparence d'une économie mal entendue, à 
produire plus que les débouches ne peuvent écouler, ce qui ramène périodiquement des crises 
commerciales, ses inconvénients, pour le corps social comme pour les producteurs eux mêmes 
seront encore plus évidents; et pourtant il ne l'est pas moins que la libre concurrence doit 
amener de tels résultats.”
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Two interesting conclusions can be derived from these surprising 
changes on Cournot’s arguments. On the one hand, even if his theory 
of oligopoly was developed under the assumption of “fixed prices”, 
his normative point of view is built upon a different conception of the 
organization of the markets. Dos Santos Ferreira (2004) resumes clearly 
Cournot’s pure theory of oligopoly:
La notion de concurrence s’insère donc chez Cournot dans un schema non 
cooperative, où le principe d’uniformité du prix impose cependant une forte 
coordination (p : 545).
Under this pure theoretical conception (i.e. the one developed in his early 
book) the competitors do not have the power to attract his competitors’ 
demand because there is an automatic adjustment process leading the 
prices of other competitors to align. As Dos Santos Ferreira (2004) also 
noticed: 
In a certain way, the cournotian producers act in an isolated way as if they 
were still monopolists, but this is confined within a fraction of the market (p: 
545)11.
This automatic mechanism of price alignment is abandoned in his 
normative analysis about competition. Following this change in his 
conception of the organization of market, in favor maybe of a more 
empirical one, Cournot also concludes that the Monopoly could achieve 
more suitable results because it is a more stable situation. In opposition to 
the erratic behavior of a competitive market, where producers are guided 
by their permanent anxiety to gain a part of the total demand against their 
competitors, the monopolist is never menaced and thus never pushed 
to act in an irrational manner. These pragmatic considerations are very 
similar to those we find in Marshall’s and Edgeworth’s works.
On the other hand, the presence of some elements of a general equilibrium 
framework is the confirmation of an early sliding already present in his 
first book. In the 11th chapter of this book, Cournot take some risks to go 
into the perils of a general equilibrium analysis. But he renounces very 
11 Our Translation. Original french quotation: «D’une certaine manière, les producteurs 
cournotiens, agissant chacun de son côté, se comportent encore en monopoleurs, quoique sur 
une frange du marché ».
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fast to continue further. As Dos Santos Ferreira & Gérard-Varet (2000) 
recognize it, Cournot tries to avoid the difficulties of general equilibrium, 
in particular, the necessary modifications on the demand functions. These 
lead to the introduction of the income and the prices of other commodities 
as changing arguments of the function and not as parameters like in a 
partial equilibrium conception. If we return to Cournot’s late book (1863) 
we can find that a great part of the book is developed exploring this kind 
of considerations. The effect of competition on wages is but one example 
of this. Cournot analysis the bad consequence of competition on wages 
and concludes that the organization of workers unions is well justified by 
the effects of competition (Cournot 1863: book III, chapter X). Moreover, 
at least two thirds of these books are related to considerations of a very 
complex framework taking into account the interactions between different 
sectors of an integrated system of markets.
Most of these conclusions on competition and the normative appreciation 
of the negative consequences competition and the positives of monopoly 
have being neglected by the second hand place given to Cournot’s late 
book. We can now advance a conclusion about the role of those different 
views on Monopoly and competition in Cournot’s global work: his pure 
theoretical conception leads him to conclude on the traditional evaluation 
on monopoly as an undesirable situation because of the possibility for 
the monopolists to fix a high price and a low supply. However, a more 
pragmatic view on monopoly, based on a general equilibrium framework, 
allows him softening this conclusion and giving a more complex normative 
point of view. We can now go into the history of the early heritage of 
Cournot’s views to show how this different point of views are to be found 
in authors like Walras, Edgeworth and Marshall.
4.  The legacy of the two views on competition
It is necessary to repeat that we do not pretend to assert that the 
influence of Cournot on the authors we will consider is a direct one. To be 
sure, even if it is easy and it has been well documented that Cournot’s first 
work on economics was read and well appreciated by those authors, it is 
not clear whether they were as interested on his 1863 book as they were 
on the first. Nonetheless, we will try to show that both views on monopoly 
are associated with those authors and, most important, that the reasons 
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and the theoretical implications of those views are related to those we 
found in Cournot’s works.
Walras: monopoly theory as applied economics and the commutative 
justice precept
As it is confirmed by Walras himself, he was influenced by Cournot’s 
reading. But this influence is only recognized on two matters: 1) the 
methodological position of Cournot’s as a champion of the mathematical 
economics school; 2) the pure theory of monopoly as presented in 
Cournot’s first book. 
It is not necessary to go deeper into the importance Walras gave to the 
mathematical language. as its natural one, for economics. On this point, 
Walras recognizes the main place of Cournot as the founder father of the 
school. In particular, he acknowledges the primacy of Cournot’s theory of 
demand. Nonetheless, Walras considers that Cournot’s demand function 
was incomplete for it lacks of the prices of other commodities and the 
income as arguments of the function. Briefly, Cournot was wrong to try 
to construct a model within a partial equilibrium framework. Associated 
with this criticism, Walras accused Cournot to be too much interested 
on “applied economics” (i.e. empirical questions). This sounds, as far as 
our considerations are true, very contradictory with the points of views 
Cournot develops in his last book. In fact, as we have showed, the empirical 
issues and the normative considerations on competition are analyzed by 
Cournot within a general equilibrium framework (of course, not completely 
developed as Walras’ one). Here we find the first, contradictory legacy of 
Cournot analysis on monopoly.
The pure theory of Monopoly as applied economics
In his “Élements d’Économie Politique Pure”, Walras (1988) includes, 
as his last chapter (41th lesson), some considerations on Monopoly. Given 
the strict separation between Pure and Applied economics for Walras, this 
chapter may be considered as an intruder. In fact, we find the same subject 
as part of his “Études d’Économie Politique Appliquée” (Walras 1992). 
However, the main difference between those expositions on Monopoly lies 
on the fact that in the “pure economics” book, Walras develops, what we 
could name a “pure theory” of Monopoly. This theory, as Walras himself 
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recognized it, is Cournot’s theory with a little contribution of Dupuit’s 
analysis. We can thus argue that Walras’s pure theoretical conception of 
Monopoly is direct legacy of Cournot’s. However, two warnings must be 
given here. First, Walras’s notice at the very beginning of his 41th lesson on 
Monopoly (in his Elements of pure economics) that one main assumption 
of his entire book has to be abandoned: 
… [T]hat of the absolute free competition in exchange, production and 
capitalization. Thus, so far we know only the effects of free competition. But, 
whatever the economists say or seems to say, perfect competition is not only 
possible form of industrial organization” (Walras 1988: 655)12
In fact, following his methodological conception, Walras seems to talk 
about Monopoly as an “imperfection” of the market. As a “perturbation” of 
the perfect competition situation. This methodological conception, which 
has been inherited by the neo-walrasian Arrow-Debreu model, implies that 
a more realistic case must be understood and judged as a perturbation of 
a more general, but purely theoretical, situation: the perfect competitive 
general equilibrium. 
However, the reader of the 41th lesson is disappointed because this 
“imperfection” is not analyzed following the strict method consisting in 
introducing some modifications of the original “perfect” model. Walras’s 
exposition of the Monopoly theory is developed within a partial equilibrium 
framework. This is obvious, because it is a direct legacy of Cournot’s 
(2001) chapter 5. However, the epistemological status of this pure theory 
of Monopoly is reversed in Walras’s work. For Walras, this is an applied 
question, related thus to normative issues.
The normative judgment on Monopoly as matter of justice
After having presented Cournot’s theory of Monopoly in his “Pure 
Economics” book, Walras go into an important policy issue: the question 
about the railroads management. Walras’s posture on these matters is 
12 Our translation. Orginal french quotiation : “… celle de la libre concurrence absolue en 
matière d’échange, de production et de capitalisation. Ainsi, ce que nous connaissons, ce 
sont les effets de la libre concurrence. Mais quoi qu’en disent, ou qu’en paraissent dire, assez 
souvent les économistes, la libre concurrence n’est pas le seul mode possible d’organisation de 
l’industrie…”
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quite surprising: He advocates in favor of the necessity for the Estate to 
provide this service and against the privatization of it. 
The main argument to justify this view on Monopoly is related with 
a fundamental building block of Walras’s whole intellectual program: 
namely his conception of justice. Following this conception, the general 
competitive equilibrium situation is a normative benchmark because of his 
normative properties. Without going further on this questions (see Jaffé 
1977), we can use a quotation from the mentioned chapter on Monopoly 
in Walras’s “Applied Economics” book where the violation of perfect 
competition conditions by monopoly is clearly established. The two main 
conditions being:
[1] That there exists a unique price for every service and good in the market, 
this is the price upon which demand and supply equate, [2] and that the selling 
price equates the production cost of productive services of factors. These two 
conditions can be reduced to one condition: exchange being made, for all 
productive services of factors, at exchange rates voluntarily accepted by all 
factor owners; and this condition is a matter of justice. (Walras 1992: 186, we 
underline)13
This quotation sums up the role of the competitive equilibrium as a 
norm of justice which constitutes a normative and a theoretical point of 
reference. A normative one because Walras always judges the “imperfect 
competition situations” as deviations from the “first best” situation of 
perfect competition. But also a theoretical reference, because in order to 
understand, from an analytical point of view, a particular organization of 
the market, the walrasian analysis describes it as a departure from the this 
theoretical referent. It is thus also a methodology for pure economics and 
not only a normative analysis (see Benetti 1997). 
To grasp the implication of this methodological point of view for 
Walras’s conception of Monopoly and his political position in favor of the 
intervention of the Estate on the railroad industry, we have to explain how 
13 Our translation. Original French quotation: «Qu’il n’y ait, pour les services et pour les produits, 
qu’un seul prix sur le marché, celui auquel a lieu l’égalité de l’offre et de la demande, et que 
le prix de vente des produits soit égal à leur prix de revient en services, ces deux conditions 
n’en font qu’une seule et unique qui est que les services s’échangent les un contre les autres 
suivant des proportions communes résultant des dispositions de tous leurs propriétaires; et 
cette condition est une condition de justice … » 
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Walras’s judge the Monopoly as a transgression of the two main features 
of the perfect competitive situation. This will allow us to understand 
how Walras’s normative analysis on Monopoly leads him to propose a 
modification on the theoretical conception of Cournot’s pure theory. 
On the one hand, the Monopoly goes against the equality between 
costs (i.e. prix de revient) and total income for the entrepreneur (i.e. prix de 
vente). The explanation of this is given by the strict application of Cournot’s 
pure theory of Monopoly: a monopolist can sell at high price because of 
his market power. On the other hand, and here comes the theoretical 
departure from the cournotian framework, the monopolist is always 
capable to discriminate prices for each consumer. Here, Walras follows 
Dupuit’s theory against the assumption of the unique price postulated by 
Cournot. Walras gives us a quotation by Dupuit: 
This solution, says Dupuit, stands upon this general principle: what the price 
of a service must be is not what it costs for the provider of this service, but 
the amount of the valuation made by the receiver of the service following the 
importance he gives to it. We cannot accept without restriction this so-called 
principle, that being formulated in that absolutist form would be harmful 
against every form of Justice. (Walras 1992, p: 192)14
We now come to the core of the normative problem. It is because 
the railroad is a natural monopoly, that it cannot be given to the private 
capital to exploit it: because of an argument of justice. Thus, it belongs to 
the Estate, the community as a whole, to take control of the railroads to 
avoid the injustices of private monopolist. In fact, a private monopolist 
will charge a differentiated price scheme. On the contrary, the Estate will 
charge only the cost of production (i.e. prix de revient). We will show it in 
the next section that there is an important difference between Walras and 
Edgeworth – Marshall, concerning this particular point of view. 
Summing up, Walras has a normative position against the existence of 
private monopolies. This is supported on a theoretical conception of it that 
departures from the Cournotian pure theory following Dupuit’s theory of 
14 Our translation. Original french quotation: ““’Cette solution, dit Dupuit, repose sur ce principe 
général, c’est qu’il faut demander pour prix du service rendu non pas ce qu’il coûte à celui qui 
le rend, mais une somme en rapport avec l’importance qu’y attaché celui à qui il est rendu. 
Nous ne saurions, quant à nous, accepter sans restrictions ce soi-disant principe qui, énoncé 
d’une façon aussi absolue, serait destructive de toute justice. »
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differentiation price policy of monopolists. Even if Cournot’s normative 
analysis on monopolies is built upon a general equilibrium framework, 
we showed that Walras takes the opposite way around: the theoretical 
framework within which he tackles the case of monopoly is the partial 
equilibrium analysis of a mixture of Cournot and Dupuit theories.
Edgeworth and Marshall: some normative coincidence in a different 
theoretical framework
Edgeworth and Marshall highly praised Cournot. In particular 
they recognized his originality and audacity putting economics into a 
mathematical language. However, both departed from Cournot analysis 
of the oligopoly model, introducing this analysis in a different conception 
of the notion of competition. Concerning Cournot’s monopoly theory, 
both Marshall and Edgeworth, agree on its basic conclusions, but they 
saw this model as the most primitive theory of Monopoly. The both tried 
to enriched, not to abandon, the cournotionan framework. Nevertheless, 
this theoretical enrichment leads them to throw away the main theoretical 
hypothesis of Cournot’s pure theory of Monopoly.
Edgeworth (2003), following Marshall (Marshall 1890, book V, Chapter 
13), states that Cournot’s theory of the price of monopoly is only a particular 
case of a more general model. The general case, according to Edgeworth, is 
not to suppose that the monopolist is constantly threatened by competitors. 
This conception of the monopoly derives from their general views on 
competition. In fact, the well-known notion of recontracting (Edgeworth 
1881) supposes the existence of a permanent menace point for every 
competitor. The whole theory of prices in Edgeworth, is built upon the 
assumption of the constant possibility to break contracts and recontract 
with other agents. In this sense, the edgeworthian market is view as a huge 
zone where information flaws are essential. In this framework, Edgeworth 
proposes the following idea: if a monopolist is trying to keep his market 
power, he cannot ask for the maximum price an agent would pay, but an 
intermediary price between his own marginal cost of production and this 
maximum level. Here we rejoin the Marshallian influence on Edgeworth. 
Marshall has presented a concept for this situation which he called (Marshall 
1890, Ibid) the Compromised Benefit. Both English authors considered 
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that the general case is this constantly threaten monopolist. The case 
where the monopoly can put the highest price is what Edgeworth presents 
as nonsense:
That is, excepting the arbitrary supposition that the second monopolist is such 
a fool as to act in the manner ascribed to him by Cournot's equation. But even 
if he were to do so, though there would exist a definite position of equilibrium, 
it would not be the one assigned by the theory here combated.” (Edgeworth 
1925, p: 138).
Edgeworth transposed the analysis of monopoly into a quasi-competitive 
framework. Being more precise, Edgeworth’s analysis consists on the case 
of a monopolist which is potentially confronted to the presence of some 
competitors: this means an oligopoly case. In fact Egeworth’s general price 
theory is a generalization of an oligopoly case where: 1) the pure monopolist 
of Cournot can only exist if and only if he has the whole monopoly of the 
market, namely he has a “natural monopoly” in Edgeworth’s conception; 
2) the perfect competitive situation is attained when a important number 
of competitors go into the market and the information about contracts is 
public. 
Upon this theoretical framework, Edgeworth nourishes a normative 
appreciation on monopoly very close to Marshall’s and Cournot’s. In fact, 
the three authors under consideration, have some arguments in favor of 
the existence of private monopolies. This contrasts with Walras’s radical 
opposition. The arguments are also very different from those that Walras 
could accept. 
Edgeworth clearly sums up his normative position:
“In general, prices under monopoly are higher than they would have been 
under competition, other things being equal. But other things are not equal, 
for the expenses of production are apt to be less under monopoly, owing (1) 
to the advantages of production on a large scale; (2) the avoidance of waste in 
advertising against each other some 3.000.000 dollars, of which two-thirds at 
least could be saved by combination.” (Edgeworth 2003, p: 487).
These empirical arguments in favor of the monopolists have a similar 
status as those by Cournot, presented above. However, two important 
differences are present here: the presence of increasing returns to scale 
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and the costs of advertising. However, this last point is not too far from the 
cournotian idea that monopolists do not have be worry about competitors. 
Marshall in the third book of his “Industry and trade” (Marshall 1919). 
Edgeworth’s partial defense of monopoly is supported on his general 
price theory, however, Cournot has to go further, or even to abandon 
his price theory and rely on purely empirical appreciations. In fact, the 
case of increasing returns and, even clearer, the save on advertising 
expenses is perfectly conceivable as a case within Edgeworth’s analysis, 
because the presence of the threatening competitors. Nonetheless, a 
general equilibrium approach à la Cournot, could possible get rid of those 
situations. It is finally clear that those cases cannot fit into any consideration 
of walrasian pure price theory for the absence of strategic behaviors is the 
main characteristic of it.
5.  Concluding remarks
Besides their theoretical works Marginalists authors show a keen 
interest in the practical issues of their times. In particular, the regulation 
of non-competitive structures were since the end of the 19th century a 
main issue for economists. Their approach these issues supported on their 
theoretical framework allowing them to identify the appropriate spaces for 
government intervention; those where perfect competition doesn’t hold. 
The action of the State is justified not only in the presence of market 
failures but also because it is the only way to address justice issues, which 
lay beyond the scope of pure theory. 
This exploration also shows how authors as Walras, tough considered a 
pure theoretician, believe there is no single recipe for dealing with different 
market structures. Monopolies should be regulated differently depending 
on the goods and services they provide. 
Finally, Marginalists considered that problems of political economy 
cannot be reduced to compatibility of incentives or mechanism design: 
we must consider other motivations of human action and the political 
institutions in order to have a complete picture and optimal solutions.
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